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Abstract
Assignment markets involve matching with transfers, as in labor markets and housing mar-
kets. We consider a two-sided assignment market with agent types and stochastic structure
similar to models used in empirical studies, and characterize the size of the core in such mar-
kets. Each agent has a randomly drawn productivity with respect to each type of agent on
the other side. The value generated from a match between a pair of agents is the sum of the
two productivity terms, each of which depends only on the type but not the identity of one of
the agents, and a third deterministic term driven by the pair of types. We allow the number
of agents to grow, keeping the number of agent types fixed. Let n be the number of agents
and K be the number of types on the side of the market with more types. We find, under
reasonable assumptions, that the relative variation in utility per agent over core outcomes is
bounded as O∗(1/n1/K), where polylogarithmic factors have been suppressed. Further, we show
that this bound is tight in worst case. We also provide a tighter bound under more restrictive
assumptions. Our results provide partial justification for the typical assumption of a unique
core outcome in empirical studies.
Keywords: Assignment markets, matching, transferable utility, core, uniqueness of equilibrium,
random market.
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1 Introduction
We study bilateral matching markets such as marriage markets, labor markets, and housing mar-
kets, that allow participants to form partnerships with each other for mutual benefit. The two
classical models of such matching markets are the non-transferable utility (NTU) model of Gale
and Shapley [7], where payments are not allowed between the agents; and the Shapley-Shubik-
Becker transferable utility (TU) model [17, 3], where transfer payments are allowed between pairs
of agents who form a match. For each of these models the natural solution concept is that of a
stable outcome, in which there is no pair of agents who would be happier with each other than in
their current outcome. In fact, for TU matching markets, it is well known that the notion of a
stable outcome coincides with that of a competitive equilibrium. A stable outcome is guaranteed
to exist in any two-sided market, but is typically not unique. The concept of stability is widely
used as a starting point in theoretical and empirical studies in the context of matching. A nearly
unique stable outcome is required in order to facilitate predictions, comparative statics and so on,
but little is known about when this occurs in the TU setting.1 In this work, we seek to characterize
the size of the set of stable matches as a function of market characteristics in TU matching markets.
The motivation for our work is twofold. First, uniqueness of the stable outcome is typically
assumed in empirical investigations, though there is insufficient theoretical basis to justify such an
assumption. We ask when such an assumption is justified. Second, it is of interest to know whether
basic market primitives, i.e., the number of agents and the values of possible matches, are sufficient
to determine the outcome of the market, or whether there is significant ambiguity arising from
which equilibrium the market is in. Can a labor market support higher wages for labor without
adding jobs or improving productivity, just by moving to a different equilibrium? In TU matching
markets, market primitives like the value generated by a pair/match, and even transfers occurring
in outcomes are difficult to observe, which has hindered empirical studies of features like core size
(NTU markets are much easier to study empirically2). This further increases the importance of
generating theoretical predictions of core size, which can also potentially guide future empirical
work.
We consider the assignment game model of Shapley and Shubik [17], consisting of “workers”
and “firms” each of whom can match with at most one agent on the other side. To model the
different skills of the workers and the different requirements of the firms, we assume that there are
K types of workers and Q types of firms. Matching worker i with firm j generates a value Φij
(this can be divided between i and j in an arbitrary manner since transfers are allowed), which
we model as a sum of two terms: a term u(·, ·) that depends only on the types of i and j, and a
term ψi,j that represents the “idiosyncratic” contributions of worker i to firm j. In our model the
u(·, ·) is assumed to be fixed, but the ψij is the sum of two random variables, the “productivity”
of worker i with respect to the type of firm j and, symmetrically, the “productivity” of firm j with
respect to the type of worker i. These productivities are assumed to be independently drawn from
a bounded distribution (satisfying certain assumptions) for each (agent,type) pair. In addition to
being normatively attractive, such a generative model for the value of a match has been used in
empirical studies of marriage markets, starting with Choo and Siow [5, 4, 8].
We study the size of the set of stable outcomes for a random market constructed in this way.
Shapley and Shubik [17] showed that the set of stable outcomes (which is the same as the core) has
a lattice structure, and thus has two extreme stable matchings: the worker optimal stable match,
where each worker earns the maximum possible and each firm the minimum possible in any stable
matching; and the firm optimal stable matching which is the symmetric counterpart. Also, all
stable outcomes live on a maximum weight matching, which is generically unique. Given these
1A small core has been found in special cases of the TU setting as in [9, 10, 11], which we discuss below. In the
case of the NTU setting, real markets have almost always been found to contain a nearly unique stable outcome, e.g.
[16], and a body of theory explains this, e.g. [13, 14, 1, 12, 2].
2 See footnote 1.
1
structural properties, our metric for the size of the core is quite natural: we consider the difference
between the maximum and minimum utility of a worker (equivalently, a firm) in the core, averaged
over matched workers (or firms). Our main result is that the size of the set of stable matchings,
as measured by this metric, is small under some reasonable assumptions on market structure:
specifically, the expected core size is O∗(1/ ℓ
√
n) in a problem with n agents, and at most ℓ types of
agents on each side (with ℓ fixed). We show that this bound is essentially tight by constructing a
sequence of markets such that the core size is Ω(1/ ℓ
√
n). Thus the core shrinks with market size,
and this shrinking is faster when there are fewer types of agents. Additionally, we obtain a tighter
upper bound in the special case with just one type of employer and more employers than workers.
Our upper bound in this case improves sharply as the number of additional employers m increases;
we establish a bound of O∗(1/(n1/ℓm1−1/ℓ)), where ℓ is the number of worker types.
Our model has the following property (here, think of u( · , · ) as being formally incorporated
in the worker productivity): For every (worker type, firm type) pair, there is a “price” associated
with this type-pair, such that for every matched pair of agents of these types, the utility of each
agent is her productivity (with respect to the type on the other side), “corrected” additively (in
opposite directions) by the price. We show that variation in these type-pair prices is uniformly
bounded as O∗(1/ ℓ
√
n) across core allocations, in expectation, implying the bound on core size. A
key component of our analysis is to relate the combinatorial structure of the core to order statistics
of certain independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables (r.v.s). These r.v.s are
one-dimensional projections of point processes in (particular subregions of) the unit hypercube,
where the point processes correspond to the market realization. An analytical challenge that we
face is that the relevant projections as well as the relevant order statistics are themselves a random
function of the market realization. We overcome this via appropriate union bounds. Our analysis
throws light on which aspects of market structure affect the core and its size.
Most of the related literature focuses on the NTU model of Gale and Shapley [7]. For that
model, a number of papers establish a small core under various assumptions such as short preference
lists [13, 14, 15], strongly correlated preferences [12, 2]. In a recent paper Ashlagi et al. [1] show
that in a random NTU matching market with long lists and uncorrelated preferences, even a slight
imbalance results in a significant advantage for the short side of the market and that there is
approximately a unique stable matching. Further, the near uniqueness of the stable matching is
found to be robust to varying correlations in preferences and other features, suggesting that a
small core may be generic in NTU matching markets. There is an extensive literature on large
assignment games that extends the many structural properties established by Shapley and Shubik
for finite assignment games to a setting in which the agents form a continuum, see for example
Gretzky, Ostroy and Zame [9, 10]. Those papers also show convergence of large finite markets to
the continuum limit, including that the core shrinks to a point. However, unlike in our model,
they model the productivity of each partnership as a deterministic function of the pair of types,
with the only randomness being in the number of agents of each type. The work on assignment
games that is most closely related to our work is a recent preprint of Hassidim and Romm [11]: in
their model, all workers (firms) are a priori identical, and the value of matching worker i to firm
j is a random draw from a bounded distribution, independently for every pair (i, j). For such a
model, they establish an approximate “law of one price,” i.e., that workers are paid approximately
identical salaries in any core allocation, and that the long side gets almost none of the surplus in
unbalanced markets. In contrast, we work with multiple types of workers and firms, and the value
of a match depends on the types of each agent, and random variables that depend on the identity
of one of the agents and the type (but not the identity) of the other agent.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We present our model in Section 2, our results
in Section 3, and an overview of the proof of our main result in Section 4. We conclude with a
discussion in Section 5. Several proofs are deferred to appendices.
2
2 Model Formulation
We consider a two-sided, transferable utility matching market with a finite number of agents. The
sides of the market are represented by the labor (L) and the employers (E). Let nL be the number
of agents in L and nE be the number of agents in E ; we let n := |L| + |E| denote the size of the
market, i.e., the total number of agents in the problem. We assume that the underlying graph
is complete, that is, all pairs of agents can potentially be matched. Each side of the market is
partitioned into a finite number of types and we let K and Q denote the number of different types
of agents in L and E respectively. We define TL := {1, . . . ,K} and TE := {1, . . . , Q} to be the set of
types in the labor and employer side respectively. Let T = TL×TE denote the set of pairs of types.
If nL = nE we say that the problem is balanced. Otherwise, we say that the problem is unbalanced.
In addition, for a given type t ∈ TL ∪ TE , we denote by nt the number of agents of type t. Finally,
let τ(a) denote the type of agent a ∈ L ∪ E ; given a type t and an agent a, we say that a ∈ t if
τ(a) = t. In what follows we typically use i to denote an individual agent in L, and j to denote an
individual agent in E .
The value of the match between i and j is denoted Φ(i, j). An outcome is a pair (M,γ), where
M is a matching between agents in L and E , and γ is a payoff vector such that γi + γj = Φ(i, j)
for every pair of matched agents i ∈ L, j ∈ E , (i, j) ∈ M . That is, the vector γ indicates how
the value of a match is divided among the agents involved in the match. In this paper we shall be
concerned with outcomes that are in the core, i.e., outcomes such that no coalition of players can
produce greater value among themselves than the sum of their utilities. Shapley and Shubik [17]
show that for this matching market model, an outcome (M,γ) is in the core if and only if it is
satisfies stability. The stability condition requires γi + γj ≥ Φ(i, j) for all i ∈ L and j ∈ E , and
further requires the γ vector to be non-negative.3 The set of stable outcome utilities turns out
to be the set of optima of the dual to the maximum weight matching linear program, implying in
particular that the matching M in a stable outcome must be a maximum weight matching.
2.1 Structure of Φ(i, j)
We assume that Φ(i, j) is additively separable as follows.
Assumption (Separability). Φ(i, j) = u(τ(i), τ(j)) + ǫ
τ(i)
j + η
τ(j)
i .
It is natural to think that the value of matching i and j can be broken down into a sum of two
components: a utility u(τ(i), τ(j)) that depends only on the agents’ types, and a term ψ
τ(i),τ(j)
i,j
which is match specific and potentially depends on both the identity of the agents as well as their
types. The separability assumption states that the match-specific component is further additively
separable into two terms that each depend on the identity of one of the agents and only the type
of the other agent. In particular, for any fixed employer j and two distinct workers i, i′ ∈ L we
have ǫ
τ(i)
j = ǫ
τ(i′)
j whenever τ(i) = τ(i
′), as the term ǫ only depends on the type of the agents in
L. Analogously, the term η depends on the individual worker i ∈ L but only the type of the firm
j ∈ E .
We model the term u(τ(i), τ(j)) as a fixed constant, whereas the ǫ and η terms are modelled as
random variables, independent across agent type pairs. The continuum limit of such a model was
introduced by Choo and Siow [5], who used the model to empirically estimate certain structural
features of marriage markets. Such a model is attractive in allowing for reasonable heterogeneity
and idiosyncratic variation via the random variables, while still remaining structured due to a fixed
number of types. While these features have been important in facilitating estimation [5, 4], they
simultaneously also make this a plausible model of real markets.
3Note that in any unstable outcome, there must either be an individual agent who would prefer to not participate
in the matching (because of a negative payoff) or a blocking pair of agents who can both do better by matching with
each other (because the value they generate by matching with each other exceeds their current payoffs).
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We further assume that the terms ǫ
τ(i)
j , η
τ(j)
i are independent random draws from the uniform
[0, 1] distribution. While the assumption of i.i.d. U [0, 1] r.v.s appears quite restrictive, our results
and proofs extend to arbitrary non-atomic bounded distributions supported on a closed interval,
with positive density everywhere in the support.
2.2 Preliminaries
We now state some preliminary observations on the structure of the core under the separability
assumption. We start by showing that the payoffs can be expressed more conveniently. For each
i ∈ L and each type q ∈ TE , let η˜qi = u(τ(i), q) + ηqi .
In our market model with probability 1 the maximum weight matching is unique, so we assume
a unique maximum weight matching M to simplify the exposition. We denote by M(t) the set of
agents who are matched to an agent of type t under M . In addition, we use U to denote the set of
unmatched agents under matching M .
Proposition 1. Let M be the unique maximum weight matching. Any core solution (M,γ), cor-
responds to a vector α ∈ RK×Q such that the payoffs can be expressed as:
• γi = η˜qi − αkq, for all i ∈ L such that τ(i) = k and i ∈M(q).
• γj = ǫkj + αkq, for all j ∈ E such that τ(j) = q and j ∈M(k).
Proposition 1 follows from stability, and formalizes the existence of a single “price” for every
type-pair (k, q) that is common across all matched pairs of agents with those types. Based on
Proposition 1, any core solution can be expressed in terms of the maximum weight matching M
and the vector α.
The following proposition states necessary and sufficient conditions for (M,α) to be a core
outcome. (The maximum over an empty set is defined as −∞.)
Proposition 2. Let M be the unique maximum weight matching. The following conditions are
necessary and sufficient for (M,α) to be a core solution:
(ST) For every pair of types (k, q), (k′, q′) ∈ T :
min
i∈k′∩M(q′)
η˜q
′
i − η˜qi + min
j∈q∩M(k)
ǫkj − ǫk
′
j ≥ αk′q′ − αkq ≥ max
i∈k∩M(q)
η˜q
′
i − η˜qi + max
j∈q′∩M(k′)
ǫkj − ǫk
′
j .
(IM) For every pair of types (k, q) ∈ T :
min
j∈q∩M(k)
ǫkj ≥ −αkq ≥ max
j∈q∩U
ǫkj ,
and min
i∈k∩M(q)
η˜qi ≥ αkq ≥ max
i∈k∩U
η˜qi .
The first set of conditions follow from the non-existence of a blocking pair of matched agents.
The second conditions follow from the fact that utilities are non-negative (implying the left inequal-
ities) and the non-existence of a blocking pair involving an unmatched agent. See [4, Proposition
1] for a proof.
We conclude with a definition of the size of the core, denoted by C. We define C as the difference
between the maximum and minimum utility of a worker (or firm) in the core, averaged over workers
matched under M . This can be equivalently stated in terms of the vector α. For each pair of types
(k, q) ∈ T , let αmaxkq and αminkq be the maximum and minimum possible values of αkq among core α
vectors.
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Definition 1 (Size of the core). Let M be the unique maximum weight matching. For each pair of
types (k, q) ∈ T , let N(k, q) denote the number of matches between agents of type k and agents of
type q. Then, the size of the core is denoted by C and is defined as:
C =
∑
k
∑
qN(k, q)|αmaxkq − αminkq |∑
k
∑
qN(k, q)
.
3 Results
We keep the number of agent types fixed and allow the number of agents to grow, focusing on how
the size of the core scales as the market grows.
Given the stochastic nature of the our problem, the size of the core C is itself a random variable.
Therefore, the main focus of our work is to study how the expected value of C depends on the
characteristics of the market. In finite markets it is generically possible to marginally modify some
payoffs in a core solution without violating stability and, therefore, the size of the core is strictly
positive [17]. However, as the size of the market increases (the agent types stay the same), the
set of core vectors α should shrink as an increase in the number of stability constraints limits the
possible perturbations to the payoffs, cf. Proposition 2.
We start by considering the simple case of markets with one type on each side, that is K =
Q = 1. Given that there is only one type of agent on each side, the deterministic utility term
u = u(τ(i), τ(j)) will be the same for all possible matches, regardless the identity of the agents.
The value of a match between agents i ∈ L and j ∈ E is Φ(i, j) = u+ ηi + ǫj . Suppose u > 0.
Remark 1. In the case of a balanced market, i.e., nL = nE , the above market has C ≥ u with
probability 1. In particular, E[C] = Ω(1).
The idea is the following: all agents will be matched in a stable solution and by Proposition 1,
we can describe the size of the core in terms of a single parameter α; by Proposition 2, the core
consists of all α ∈ [−minj ǫj, u + mini ηi]. In other words, the value u that is part of Φ(i, j) for
each (i, j) can be split in an arbitrary fashion between employers and workers. On the other hand,
in case of any imbalance, i.e., nL 6= nE , it turns out that u must go entirely to the short side of
the market, and the size of the core is O(1/n) (the distance between consecutive order statistics of
the ǫj ’s or the ηi’s). Thus, the core is small and rapidly shrinking in any unbalanced market in the
case of K = Q = 1.
We now consider the general case of K types of labor and Q types of employers. The following
condition generalizes the imbalance condition to the case of multiple types. The idea is to get
rid of the cases that, for certain values of deterministic utilities u( · , · ), may resemble a balanced
problem.
Assumption 1. For ever pair of subsets of types S ⊆ TL and S ′ ⊆ TE we must have
∑
t∈S nt 6=∑
t∈S′ nt. In words, this means that there is no subset of types such that the submarket formed by
agents of those types is balanced.
We highlight that in our setting with fixed K and Q and growing n, “most” markets satisfy
Assumption 1.4
We make a further regularity assumption, namely that the number of agents of each type grows
linearly in the size of the market.
Assumption 2. There exists C > 0 such that for all types t ∈ TL ∪ TE , we have nt ≥ Cn.
We now present our main theorem.
4Consider possible vectors N = {(nt)t∈TL∪TE :
∑
t nt = n} describing the number of agents of each type. Then
O(1/n) fraction of these vectors violate Assumption 1.
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Theorem 1. Consider K ≥ 1 types of labor, and Q ≥ 1 types of employers. There exists f(n) =
O∗
(
1
max(K,Q)
√
n
)
such that under Assumption 1 and Assumption 2, for a market with n agents we
have E[C] ≤ f(n). Further, there exists a sequence of markets with K types of labor and Q types of
employers such that E[C] = Ω
(
1
max(K,Q)
√
n
)
.
In words, our main result says that under reasonable conditions, E[C] is vanishing as n → ∞,
at a rate O∗
(
1
max(K,Q)
√
n
)
and that this bound is tight in worst case. Thus, the core size shrinks to
zero as the market grows larger, at a rate that is faster (in worst case) if there are fewer types of
agents. We give a proof of our main theorem in Section 4.1, along with Appendices B and C.
The upper bound in Theorem 1 can be improved if further constraints are imposed on the
number of types and the imbalance. As an illuminating example, we show that in the setting in
which K ≥ 2, Q = 1 and nE > nL, the size of the core can be bounded above by a function that
depends on both the size of the market and on the size of the imbalance in the market.
Theorem 2. Consider the setting in which K ≥ 2, Q = 1, nE > nL and let m = nE − nL. Under
Assumption 2, we have E[C] ≤ O∗
(
1
n
1
Km
K−1
K
)
.
For m = O∗(1), the bound in Theorem 2 matches that in Theorem 1. However, the bound here
becomes tighter as the imbalance m grows. In fact, for m = Θ(n), the core size is bounded as
O∗(1/n). It is noteworthy that the scaling behavior here does not depend on the number of worker
types. We also mention here that, using symmetry, an analogous result can be stated with Q types
of employers, only one type of worker, and more workers than employers.
We prove Theorem 2 in Appendix D. The idea is to use the unmatched agents and condition
(IM) in Proposition 2 (for the employers) to control absolute variation in one of the α’s. We
separately control the relative variation of the α’s in the core using condition (ST) in Proposition
2 under Assumption 2. Combining these we obtain the stated bound on C.
4 Overview of the proof of the main result
We now present an overview of our proof of Theorem 1. We first discuss the key steps in establishing
the upper bound (the complete proof can be found in Appendix B), and then sketch the proof of
the lower bound in Section 4.3 (completed in Appendix C).
Throughout this section, we assume that there is a unique maximum weight matching and we
refer to it as M . Given M , recall that N(k, q) is defined as the number of matches between agents
of type k and agents of type q in M .
We start by constructing a graph associated with matching M as follows. Let G(M) be the
bipartite graph whose vertex sets are the types in L and E , and such that there is an edge between
types k ∈ TL, q ∈ TE if and only if there is an agent of type k matched to an agent of type q in M ,
i.e., N(k, q) > 0. The following lemma states a key fact regarding the structure of G(M).
Lemma 1. Let M be the unique maximum weight matching and let G(M) be the associated type-
adjacency graph. Suppose we mark the vertex in G(M) corresponding to type t if and only if at
least one agent of type t is unmatched under M . Then, under Assumption 1, with probability 1,
every connected component in G(M) must contain a marked vertex.
4.1 Overview of the upper bound proof
Roughly, the idea of the upper bound proof of Theorem 1 is as follows. We consider some suitably
defined events (which are discussed later), which occur in typical markets. Under these events, we
show that the variation in the type-pair prices is uniformly bounded as follows,
max
(k,q)∈TL×TE ,N(k,q)>0
|αmaxkq − αminkq | ≤ f(n),
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for some f(n) = O∗
(
1
n1/max(K,Q)
)
. To prove this bound, we use the graph G(M) as defined above.
Given a type t ∈ TL ∪ TE , let the distance d(t) be defined as the minimum distance in G(M) from
t to any marked vertex. By Lemma 1, every unmarked vertex t must be at a finite distance from
a marked one. Furthermore, maxt∈TL∪TE d(t) ≤ K +Q regardless the realization of the graph.
Our argument to control the variation in the α’s is by induction on d(t). To establish our
induction base, we show that the variation in all the relevant α’s associated with marked types
(these types have distance zero) is bounded. In particular, for each marked type t, we show that
maxt′: N(t,t′)>0
(
αmaxt,t′ − αmint,t′
)
≤ O∗
(
1
n1/max(K,Q)
)
. This is done in Lemma 3.
In the inductive step, we assume the bound holds for every α associated with a type whose
distance is d or less, i.e, for every (t, t′) ∈ TL × TE such that min(d(t), d(t′)) ≤ d, we have αmaxt,t′ −
αmint,t′ ≤ O∗
(
1
n1/max(K,Q)
)
. Then, we use the inductive hypothesis to show that the result must also
hold for all types whose distance is d+ 1. By the definition of distance, for every type t such that
d(t) = d + 1, there must exist a type t∗ such that d(t∗) = d and N(t, t∗) > 0. Therefore, by our
inductive hypothesis, we must have αmaxt,t∗ − αmint,t∗ ≤ O∗
(
1
n1/max(K,Q)
)
. Using this bound, we further
bound the variation in all α’s associated with type t, by controlling the relative variation of the α’s
in the core, i.e., by showing that αt,t1 − αt,t2 for types t1, t2 with matches to type t can vary only
within a range bounded by O∗
(
1
n1/max(K,Q)
)
. This is formally achieved in Lemma 4.
To conclude, we briefly describe the nature of the events that we argue must hold with high
probability. These events are related to the distance between order statistics of the projections
of points distributed independently in (sub-regions of) a hypercube. Note that, once we focus on
a single type t, the random productivities associated to an agent of type t can be described by a
D(t)-dimensional vector within the [0, 1]D(t)-hypercube, whereD(t) is dimension of the productivity
vector of agents of type t (i.e., D(t) = K if t ∈ TE and D(t) = Q otherwise). Furthermore, the
location of these points can be described by a point process in [0, 1]D(t). Hence, all the conditions
in Proposition 2 can be interpreted as geometric conditions in the unitary hypercube. We use this
geometric interpretation and relate Proposition 2 to the regions, random sets and random variables
defined below in Section 4.2.1 to prove our main theorem.
4.2 Hypercube definitions and key lemmas
As mentioned in Section 1, a key component of our analysis is to relate the combinatorial structure
of the core to order statistics of certain independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) random variables.
These random variables are one-dimensional projections of point processes in (particular subregions
of) the unit hypercube, where the point processes correspond to the market realization. Next, we
formally define the regions, random sets and random variables that will be useful in our analysis.
4.2.1 Hypercube definitions
Consider a type t ∈ TE . For each employer j : τ(j) = t, there is a vector of productivities ǫj
distributed uniformly in [0, 1]K , independently across employers. In this subsection we consider
these productivities for a given t. We suppress t in the definitions to simplify notation (so n here
corresponds to nt, and so on). Analogous definitions can be made for t ∈ TL.
Consider n i.i.d. points (ǫj)
n
j=1, distributed uniformly in the [0, 1]
K -hypercube. Here ǫj =
(ǫ1j , ǫ
2
j , . . . , ǫ
K
j ). Let K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} denote the set of dimension indices. Define the region
Rk = {x ∈ [0, 1]K : xk ≥ xk′ ∀k′ 6= k, k′ ∈ K} (1)
For k1, k2 ∈ K, k1 6= k2 and for δ ∈ [0, 1/2], define the region
Rk1,k2(δ) = {x ∈ [0, 1]K : xk1 ≥ xk ∀k /∈ {k1, k2}, k ∈ K, xk1 ≥ δ} . (2)
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Let
Vk = {x : x = ǫkj for {j : ǫj ∈ Rk}} , (3)
and V k = max
(
Difference between consecutive values in Vk ∪ {0, 1}) . (4)
Thus, Vk ⊂ [0, 1] is the set of values of the k-th coordinate of the points lying in Rk, and V k ∈ R
is the maximum difference between consecutive values in Vk ∪ {0, 1}. (As an example, if Vk =
{0.3, 0.4, 0.8}, the differences between consecutive values in Vk∪{0, 1} are 0.3, 0.1, 0.4, 0.2, resulting
in V k = 0.4.) Note that Vk is a random and finite set, and V k is a random variable. Let
Vk1,k2(δ) = {x : x = ǫk1j − ǫk2j for {j : ǫj ∈ Rk1,k2}} , (5)
and V k1,k2(δ) = max
(
Difference between consecutive values in Vk1,k2(δ) ∪ {−1 + δ, 1}) (6)
Thus, Vk1,k2 ⊂ [−1+δ, 1] is the set of values of the difference between the k1-th and k2-th coordinate
of points lying in Rk1,k2 , and V k1,k2 ∈ R is the maximum difference between consecutive values in
Vk1,k2 ∪ {−1 + δ, 1}.
In addition, for δ ∈ (0, 1/2] and k ∈ K, define
R˜k(δ) = {x ∈ [0, 1]K : xk′ ≤ δ ∀k′ ∈ K, k′ 6= k} . (7)
Let
V˜k(δ) = {x : x = ǫkj for {j : ǫj ∈ R˜k}} (8)
and V˜ k(δ) = max
(
Difference between consecutive values in V˜k(δ) ∪ {0, 1}) . (9)
We now relate the above definitions to the combinatorial structure of our problem. We now
include the type t explicitly in the names of the associated regions, sets and random variables, e.g.,
region Rk(δ) when defined for type t is referred to as Rk(t, δ).
The definition of these regions, sets and random variables might seem arbitrary at first sight.
However, it is closely related to the geometric interpretation of the stability conditions. Intuitively,
for a fixed type t ∈ TE with unmatched agents, one can bound αkt by using condition (IM) in
Proposition 2: minj∈t∩M(k) ǫkj ≥ −αkt ≥ maxj∈t∩U ǫkj . To apply this bound, we just care about the
projection onto the k-th coordinate of the points ǫj with j ∈M(k) ∪ U . The main analytical chal-
lenge we face is that the these relevant subregions are themselves a random function of the market
realization, as both M(k) and U are themselves random sets. We overcome this by appropriately
defining the region R˜k(t, δ) so that it only contains points corresponding to agents in M(k) ∪ U .
Once we have done that, it should be easy to see that minj∈t∩M(k) ǫkj−maxj∈t∩U ǫkj is upper bounded
by the maximum distance between two consecutive points in R˜k(t, δ), when projected onto their
k-th coordinate (the corner cases of all points being in M(k), or in U , turn out to be easy to
handle). This becomes precise once we introduce the set Vk(t) and the random variable V k(t, δ).
Analogously, the regions Rk(t) (for appropriate k) and Rk1,k2(t, δ) (for appropriate k1, k2) allow us
to apply the conditions (IM) and (ST) respectively, to bound the variation of α’s associated with
a type t. These relationships are more involved, so the explanation is delayed to the proofs.
Using the above notation, we now define the two events that will help us prove the results:
B1(t, δ) =
{
max
(
max
k∈K
V k(t), max
(k1,k2)∈K(2)
V k1,k2(t, δ)
)
≤ f1(nt,K)
}
, (10)
for some f1(nt,K) = O
∗(1/n1/Kt ) defined in Lemma A.1, δ ∈ [0, 1/2] and where K(2) = {(k1, k2) :
k1, k2 ∈ K, k1 6= k2}. (If K = 1, then K(2) is the empty set ∅ in which case we follow the convention
that max∅[ · ] = −∞.). In addition,
B2(t, δ) =
{
max
k∈TL
V˜ k(t, δ) ≤ f2(nt)/δK−1
}
(11)
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for some f2(nt) = O
∗(1/nt) defined in Lemma A.2 and δ ∈ (0, 1].
The proof of all lemmas auxiliary to the proof of Theorem 1 assume that these events (or some
subset of them) occur. As shown by the next result (proved in Appendix A), that assumption does
not pose a problem as these events simultaneously occur with high probability.
Lemma 2. There exists Cˆ = Cˆ(K,Q) < ∞ such that, for any δ = δ(n) ∈ (0, 1/2], the event⋂
t∈TL∪TE (B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ)) occurs with probability at least 1− Cˆ/n.
4.2.2 Statements of the key lemmas
For every type t ∈ TL ∪ TE , we define ϑ(t) as ϑ(t) = {k ∈ TL : N(k, t) > 0} when t ∈ TE and
ϑ(t) = {q ∈ TE : N(t, q) > 0} when t ∈ TL. That is, ϑ(t) is the set of neighbours of t in the graph
G(M). Recall that, given a type t ∈ TL ∪ TE we denote by D(t) the dimension of the productivity
vector of agents of type t. That is, D(t) = K if t ∈ TE and D(t) = K if t ∈ TL.
Lemma 3. Consider the unique maximum weight matching M and a type t ∈ TL ∩ TE . Let F1(t)
be the event
F1(t) = {t is marked in G(M) and at least one agent in t is matched}, (12)
that is, t has at least one unmatched and one matched agent. Let the events B1(t, δ) and B2(t, δ)
be as defined by Eqs. (10) and (11) respectively. Under F1(t) ∩ B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ), we have
max
t′∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxt,t′ − αmint,t′
) ≤ max(f1(nt,D(t)) + δ, f2(nt)/δD(t)−1) ,
where f1 and f2 agree with those in the definitions of events B1(t, δ) and B2(t, δ) respectively.
Lemma 4. Consider the unique maximum weight matching M and a type t ∈ TL ∩ TE . Let F2(t)
be the event
F2(t) = {all agents in t are matched}.
Let the event B1(t, δ) be as defined by Eq. (10). Under F2(t) ∩B1(t, δ), for every t∗ ∈ ϑ(t) we have
maxt′∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxt,t′ − αmint,t′
)
≤ (αmaxt,t∗ − αmint,t∗ )+2f1(nt,D(t))+2δ, where f1 agrees with the one in the
definition of B1(t, δ).
Using the simple lemmas defined above, we provide a sketch of proof that, together with the
explanation in Section 4.1, should suffice to roughly convey the idea while avoiding the technical
details. As a reminder, the complete proof of the upper bound in Theorem 1 can be found in
Appendix B.
Let n∗ = mint∈TL∪TE nt and let δ = 1/(n
∗)1/max(K,Q). Under Assumption 2, we have that n∗ =
Θ(n) and therefore δ = Θ
(
1/n1/max(K,Q)
)
. Furthermore, now f1(nt,D(t)) + δ and f2(nt)/δ
D(t)−1,
2f1(nt,D(t)) + 2δ as defined in the statements of Lemmas 3 and 4 are all O
∗
(
1
n1/max(K,Q)
)
. Using
this choice of δ together with the inductive argument outlined in Section 4.1, we show that under
the event
⋂
t∈TL∪TE (B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ)) we must have
max
(k,q)∈TL×TE ,N(k,q)>0
(
αmaxkq − αminkq
) ≤ O∗ (1/n1/max(K,Q)) .
4.3 Proof of the lower bound
Our lower bound follows from the following proposition, proved in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. Consider a sequence of markets (indexed by n˜) with |TL| = K types of labor, with
n˜ workers of each type, and a single type “1” of employers, with (K − 1)n˜ + 1 employers of this
type. (Assumptions 2 and 1 are satisfied.) Set u(k∗, 1) = 0 for some k∗ ∈ L, and u(k, 1) = 3 for
all k ∈ L\k∗. For this market, we have E[C] = Ω∗(1/(n1/K)).
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Note that the sequence of markets described can easily be “dressed up” to fill in the gaps in
market sizes5 and to accommodate Q ≤ K types of firms6. If Q > K, we simply swap the roles of
workers and firms in our construction, leading to E[C] = Ω∗(1/(n1/Q)) as needed. Thus, the lower
bound in Theorem 1 follows from Proposition 3.
The rough intuition for our construction in Proposition 3 is as follows: For our choice of u’s
it is not hard to see that all workers of types different from k∗ are always matched in the core.
One employer j∗ is matched to a worker of type k∗. Suppose vector (αk)k∈TL is in the core. Given
that all types k 6= k∗ are a priori symmetric, we would expect that the αk’s for k 6= k∗ are close
to each other (we formalize using Lemma D.4 that they are usually no more than δ ∼ 1/√n˜
apart). Assuming this is the case, we can order employers based on Xj = maxk 6=k∗ ǫkj − ǫk∗j , and j∗
should usually be the employer with smallest Xj , since this employer has the largest productivity
with respect to k∗ relative to the other types. Now, the Xj ’s are i.i.d., and a short calculation
establishes that the distance between the first and second order statistics of (Xj)j∈E is Θ(1/n1/K).
This “large” gap between the first two order statistics allows for (αk∗ , (αk + θ)k 6=k∗) to remain
within the core for a range of values of θ ∈ R that has expected length Θ(1/n1/2) for K = 2 and
Θ(1/n1/K)−Θ(δ) = Θ(1/n1/K) for K > 2, leading to the stated lower bound on C.
We remark that the key quantity here, the gap between the first two order statistics of (Xj)j∈E ,
is determined by the tail behavior (both the left and right tails) of the ǫ’s, along with the number
of types K. See Section 5 for further discussion.
5 Discussion
This paper quantifies the size of the core in matching markets with transfers, as a function of
market characteristics. We considered a model of an assignment market with a fixed number of
types of workers and firms. We modelled the value of a match between a pair of agents as a sum of
a deterministic term determined by the pair of types, and a random component which is the sum
of two terms, each depending on the identity of one of the agents and the type of the other. Under
reasonable assumptions, we showed that the size of the core is bounded as O∗(1/n1/ℓ), where each
side of the market contains no more than ℓ types.
Our work answers some questions but raises several others. One question is what happens if the
random productivity terms are drawn from unbounded distributions. For the market we construct
for our lower bound, the core size is determined by the tail behavior of the random productivities,
cf. Section 4.3, suggesting that the core could be larger in worst case if the productivities have an
unbounded distribution.
On the other hand, it is of interest to understand the core in typical/average case markets,
as opposed to worst case markets. Our bound of O∗(1/n) for the special case of only one type
of employer and Θ(n) more employers than workers (a corollary of Theorem 2) does not depend
on the number of worker types, in contrast to our general bound, which implies that a relatively
larger core can result in worst case from having more types. How does the core size depend on the
number of types in typical/average case markets?
It would be interesting to extend our results to many-to-one markets, where employers can
each have more than one opening. We expect that our results regarding the core (also our proofs)
extend to the case where each employer has capacity bounded by a constant, and employer utility
is additive across matches.
5Here n = (2K − 1)n˜ + 1 for n˜ = 1, 2, . . . but intermediate values of n can be handled by having slightly fewer
workers of type k∗, which leaves our analysis essentially unaffected.
6Let each worker type q 6= 1 have n˜ agents each and u( · , q) = −2. These workers are always unmatched, leaving
the core unaffected.
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A Results on point processes in the unit hypercube
Consider the K dimensional unit hypercube [0, 1]K , and the Poisson process of uniform rate n in
this hypercube, leading to N points (ǫi)
N
i=1. (Note that E[N ] = n.) Here ǫi = (ǫ
1
i , ǫ
2
i , . . . , ǫ
K
i ). Let
K = {1, 2, . . . ,K} denote the set of dimension indices.
Let Rk be the region defined by Eq. (1), and let Vk and V k be as defined by Eqs. (3) and (4)
respectively. Similarly, let Rk1,k2(δ) be the region defined by Eq. (2), and let Vk1,k2(δ) and V k1,k2(δ)
be as defined by Eqs. (5) and (6) respectively.
The following lemma, key to our proof of Theorem 1, says that with high probability, all
the (V k)’s and the (V k1,k2)’s are no larger than a (deterministic) function7 of n that scales as
O∗(1/n1/K).
Lemma A.1. Let Rk be the region defined by Eq. (1), and let Vk and V k be as defined by Eqs. (3)
and (4) respectively. Similarly, let Rk1,k2(δ) be the region defined by Eq. (2), and let Vk1,k2(δ)
and V k1,k2(δ) be as defined by Eqs. (5) and (6) respectively. Fix K ≥ 1. Then there exists
f(n,K) = O∗(1/n1/K) such that for any δ = δ(n) ∈ [0, 1/2] the following holds: Let
B1 =
{
max
(
max
k∈K
V k, max
(k1,k2)∈K(2)
V k1,k2(δ)
)
≤ f(n,K)
}
, (13)
where K(2) = {(k1, k2) : k1, k2 ∈ K, k1 6= k2}. (If K = 1, then K(2) is the empty set ∅ in which case
we follow the convention that max∅[ · ] = −∞.) We have
Pr(B1) ≥ 1− 1/n .
Proof. Let m = ⌊1/(C log n/n)1/K⌋ for some C < ∞ that we will choose later, and let ∆ = 1/m.
Note that
∆ ≥ (C log n/n)1/K . (14)
In our analysis of V k (resp. V k1,k2), we will divide the interval [0, 1] (resp. [−1 + δ, 1]) into
subintervals of size ∆ each, and show that with large probability, each subinterval contains at
least one value of ǫi ∈ Rk (resp. ǫk1i − ǫk2i for {i : ǫi ∈ Rk1,k2}). We will find that the density of
points in Vk (resp. Vk1,k2) is smallest near 0 (resp. −1 + δ), but even for the interval [0,∆] (resp.
[−1+δ,−1+δ+∆]), the number of points is Poisson with parameter Θ(n∆K) = Θ(log n), allowing
us to obtain the desired result for appropriately chosen C.
We first present our formal argument leading to a bound on V k, followed by a similar argument
leading to a bound on V k1,k2 . Let
Bk ≡
m−1⋂
i=0
{ [i∆, (i + 1)∆] ∩ Vk 6= ∅ } , (15)
where ∅ is the empty set. Clearly, Bk ⇒ V k ≤ 2∆. We now show that for any k ∈ K, we have
Pr
(Bk) ≤ 1/nK+2, for appropriately chosen C. Define
hj(x, θ) =
{
xj for x ∈ [θ, 1]
0 otherwise .
(16)
It is easy to see that Vk follows a Poisson process with density nhK−1( · , 0). The number of points
in interval [i∆, (i+ 1)∆] is hence Poisson with parameter
n
∫ (i+1)∆
i∆
hK−1(x) dx = ((i+ 1)K − iK)n∆K/K ≥ n∆K/K ≥ C log n/K ,
7In fact, our proof of Lemma A.1 identifies a bound of (C log n/n)1/K where C = 6K(K − 1), for sufficiently large
n.
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where we used the lower bound on ∆ in (14). It follows that
Pr([i∆, (i + 1)∆] ∩ Vk = ∅) ≤ exp(−C log n/K) = 1/nC/K ≤ 1/n3 ,
for C ≥ 3K. We deduce by union bound over i = 0, 1, . . . ,m− 1 and De Morgan’s law on (15) that
Pr
(Bk) ≤ m/n3 ≤ n1/K/n3 ≤ 1/n2 .
Using union bound over k we deduce that
Pr
(
∪k Bk
)
≤ K/n2 (17)
We now present a similar argument to control V k1,k2 when K ≥ 2. Let m′ = (1 − δ)/∆. (To
simplify notation we assume m′ is an integer. The case when it is not an integer can be easily
handled as well.) Let
Bk1,k2 ≡
m−1⋂
i=−m′
{ [i∆, (i + 1)∆] ∩ Vk1,k2 6= ∅ } , (18)
where ∅ is the empty set. Clearly, Bk1,k2 ⇒ V k1,k2 ≤ 2∆. We now show that for any k1 6= k2,
we have Pr
(Bk1,k2) ≤ K(K − 1)/n2, for appropriately chosen C. It is easy to see that the two-
dimensional projection (x, y) = (ǫk1i , ǫ
k2
i ) of points in Rk1,k2 follows a two-dimensional Poisson
process with density hK−2(x)I(y ∈ [0, 1]), cf. (16). We deduce that values in Vk follow a one-
dimensional Poisson process with density ng for g = hK−2( · , δ) ∗ I(∈ [−1, 0]), where ∗ is the
convolution operator. A short calculation yields
g(x) =


[
(x+ 1)K−1 − δK−1]/(K − 1) for x ∈ [−1 + δ, 0)[
1− δK−1]/(K − 1) for x ∈ [0, δ)
(1− xK−1)/(K − 1) for x ∈ [δ, 1]
0 otherwise.
The number of points in interval [i∆, (i + 1)∆] is Poisson with parameter
n
∫ (i+1)∆
i∆
g(x) dx .
Below we bound the value of this parameter for different cases on i, obtaining a bound of (K+3) log n
in each case, for large enough C.
For −m′ ≤ i < 0, the smallest parameter occurs for i = −m′, since g(x) is monotone increasing
in [−1 + δ, 0]. Thus, the Poisson parameter is lower bounded by its value for i = −m′, which is
n
[(
(δ +∆)K − δK)/K − δK−1∆]/(K − 1)
≥n∆K/(K(K − 1)) ≥ C log n/(K(K − 1)) ≥ 3 log n ,
for C ≥ 3K(K − 1), using (14), and (δ +∆)K ≥ ∆K +K∆δK−1 + δK .
For 0 ≤ i < m−m′, the Poisson parameter is
n
[
1− δK−1]∆/(K − 1) ≥ n∆/(2(K − 1)) ≥ n∆K/(K(K − 1)) ≥ 3 log n ,
using δ ≥ 1/2 and K ≥ 2.
For (m−m′) ≤ i < m, the Poisson parameter is
n(∆−∆K((1 + i)K − iK)/K)/(K − 1) .
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A short calculation allows us to again bound this below by (K + 3) log n (the bound is slack for
K > 2): Note that
∆K((1 + i)K − iK) ≤ ∆K(mK − (m− 1)K) = 1− (1−∆)K
≤ K∆−K(K − 1)∆2/2 +K(K − 1)(K − 2)∆3/6 ,
where we used that (1 + i)K − iK is monotone increasing in i for i ≥ 0. Substituting back, we
obtain that the Poisson parameter is bounded by
n(1− (K − 2)∆/3)∆2/2 ≥ n∆2/4
for (K − 2)∆/3 ≤ 1/2, which occurs for sufficiently large n. Finally, ∆2 ≥ ∆K , hence n∆2/4 ≥
n∆K/4 ≥ 3 log n for C ≥ 12.
Choosing C = 6K(K − 1), in all cases the Poisson parameter is bounded below by 3 log n. It
follows that
Pr([i∆, (i + 1)∆] ∩ Vk1,k2 = ∅) ≤ exp(−3 log n) = 1/n3 .
We deduce by union bound over i and De Morgan’s law on (18) that
Pr
(Bk1,k2) ≤ 2m/n3 ≤ n1/K/n3 ≤ 1/n2 , (19)
for large enough n. Using union bound over (k1, k2) we deduce that
Pr
(
∪(k1,k2) Bk1,k2
)
≤ K(K − 1)/n2 (20)
Combining (19) and (20) by union bound and using De Morgan’s law, we deduce that
Pr
[(
∩k Bk
)
∩
(
∩(k1,k2) Bk1,k2
)]
≥ 1−K2/n2
for large enough n. This implies that for large enough n, with probability at least 1 −K2/n2 we
have
max
(
max
k
V k,max
k1,k2
V k1,k2
)
≤ 2∆ ≤ 3(C log n/n)1/K = O∗(1/n1/K) ,
implying the main result for large enough n (note that K2/n2 < 1/n for large enough n). For
small values of n, we can simply choose f(n, k) large enough to ensure that the bound holds with
sufficient probability.
.
Lemma A.2. For k ∈ K, let R˜k(δ), V˜k(δ) and V˜ k(δ) be as defined by Eqs. (7), (8) and (9)
respectively. Fix K ≥ 1. There exists f(n) = O∗(1/n) such that for any δ ∈ (0, 1], the following
occurs: Let
B2 ≡
{
max
k∈K
V˜ k(δ) ≤ f(n)/δK−1
}
. (21)
Then
Pr(B2) ≥ 1− 1/n .
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Proof. The values in the set V˜k ⊂ [0, 1] follow a one-dimensional Poisson process with rate nδK−1.
Choose f(n) = 6 log n/n. If 6 log n/(nδK−1) ≥ 1 there is nothing to prove, since maxk∈K V˜ k(δ) ≤ 1
by definition. Hence assume 6 log n/(nδK−1) < 1. Divide [0, 1] into intervals of length ∆ =
f(n)/(3δK−1) = 3 log n/(nδK−1) (to simplify notation, we assume 1/∆ ≥ 2 is an integer. The
argument can easily be adapted to handle nδK−1/(3 log n) not an integer). The probability that
any particular interval of length ∆ does not contain a point is no more than exp(−3 log n) = 1/n3.
The number of intervals of length ∆ is 1/∆ = nδK−1/(3 log n) ≤ n for large enough n. By union
bound, with probability at least 1 − 1/n2, each ∆-interval contains at least one point, implying
that V˜ k(δ) ≤ 2∆ = f(n)/δK−1 with probability at least 1− 1/n2, as required.
In this section so far we considered the rate n Poisson process in [0, 1]K for convenience. How-
ever, the results we proved can easily be transported to the closely related model of n points
distributed i.i.d. uniformly in [0, 1]K .
Lemma A.3. Consider n points distributed i.i.d. uniformly in [0, 1]K . Lemmas A.1 and A.2 hold
for this model as well.
Proof. We use a standard coupling argument along with monotonicity of the considered random
variables with respect to additional points. Let P be a rate n/2 Poisson process in [0, 1]K . The
N points are distributed i.i.d. uniform [0, 1]K conditioned on the value of N . Let B be the event
N ≤ n. Clearly, B occurs with probability at least 1 − 1/n2. Let U be the process consisting of n
points distributed i.i.d. in [0, 1]K . Conditioned on B, we can couple the process P with the process
U such that for every point in the Poisson process, there is an identically located point in U .
We now show how to establish Lemma A.2 for process U using such a coupling. Note that
maxk∈K V˜ k(δ) is monotone non-increasing as we add more points. As such, an upper bound on this
quantity continues to hold if more points are added. For instance, consider maxk∈K V˜ k(δ). Let B′
be the event that
max
k∈K
V˜ k(δ) ≤ f(n/2)/δK−1
under P. The proof of Lemma A.2 shows that Pr(B′) ≥ 1− (2/n)2. By union bound on B and B′,
we deduce that Pr(B ∩ B′) ≥ 1− 5/n2 ≥ 1− 1/n, for large enough n. We deduce, using a coupling
as described above, that with probability at least 1− 1/n, for process U we have
max
k∈K
V˜ k(δ) ≤ f˜(n)/δK−1 ,
where f˜(n) = f(n/2), for large enough n. (For small values of n, we can simply choose f˜(n)
large enough to ensure that the bound holds with sufficient probability.) Thus we have shown that
Lemma A.2 holds for process U .
Lemma A.1 can similarly be established for process U using that
max
(
max
k∈K
V k, max
(k1,k2)∈K(2)
V k1,k2(δ)
)
is monotone non-increasing as we add more points.
We now establish another result about n points (ǫj)
n
j=1 distributed i.i.d. uniformly in [0, 1]
K .
This result is key to the proof of the tightness of Theorem 1 (Proposition 3).
For δ ∈ [0, 1] let
R̂k1,k2(δ) = {x ∈ [0, 1]K : xk1 ≥ xk2 − δ ; xk1 ≥ xk ∀k /∈ {k1, k2}, k ∈ K} (22)
Let nk1,k2(δ) be the number of points in R̂k1,k2(δ).
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Lemma A.4. Let B3 be the event that there for all k1, k2 ∈ K we have nk1,k2 ≥ 1 + n/K. For
δ = δ(n) ≥ 1/n0.49, we have that B3 occurs with high probability.
Proof. A short calculation shows that the volume of R̂k1,k2(δ) is
v =
1
K − 1
(
1− (1− δ)
K
K
)
(23)
≥ 1
K
+
δ
K − 1 −
δ2
2
(24)
≥ 1 + δ
K
(25)
for δ ≤ 2/(K(K − 1)). Now, the probability of ǫj ∈ R̂k1,k2(δ) is exactly v. It follows that nk1,k2 is
distributed as Binomial(n, v). Notice E[nk1,k2 ] = nv ≥ n(1 + δ)/K. We obtain
Pr(nk1,k2 < 1 + n/K) ≤ exp{− Ω(nδ2)} = exp{− Ω(n0.02)} = o(1) (26)
using a standard Chernoff bound (e.g., see Durrett [6]). Using union bound over pairs k1, k2 we
deduce that B3 occurs with probability o(1), i.e., event B3 occurs with high probability.
B Proof of Theorem 1 upper bound
We now present the complete proof of Theorem 1. We start by proving the lemmas stated in
Section 4.
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose not, and let C be a connected component of G(M) where all vertices
are unmarked. Abusing notation, let CL (resp. CE) denote the types in TL (resp. TE) that are in
C. By the definition of the marks, we know that all agents of types in CL ∪ CE must be matched.
Furthermore, by the definition of G(M), an agent whose type is in CL can only be matched to an
agent whose type is in CE and vice versa. Therefore, we must have that
∑
k∈CL nk =
∑
q∈CE nq,
which contradicts Assumption 1.
Proof of Lemma 2. By invoking Lemma A.1, Lemma A.2 and Lemma A.3, for each t we have that
w.p. at least 1 − 2nt the event (B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ)) occurs. As the total number of types is upper
bounded by K +Q, we apply an union bound to conclude that w.p. at least 1− 2(K+Q)n∗ , the event⋂
t∈TL∪TE (B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ)) occurs.
Before moving on to the key lemmas, we introduce some definitions. Given a type t ∈ TL ∪ TE
we denote by ν(t) or simple ν, the points in t. That is, for each agent j of type t, we define νj as
follows:
νj =
{
ǫj if t ∈ TE
ηj if t ∈ TL
For a fixed t ∈ TL ∪ TE and t′ ∈ ϑ(t), let βtt′ be defined as:
βtt′ =
{ −αtt′ if t ∈ TE
αtt′ − u(t, t′) if t ∈ TL
Using the above notation, we can re-write the conditions in Proposition 2 associated to a fixed
type t ∈ TL ∪ TE as follows:
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(ST) For every k, k′ ∈ ϑ(t):
min
j∈t∩M(k)
νkj − νk
′
j ≥ βkt − βk′t ≥ max
j∈t∩M(k′)
νkj − νk
′
j .
(IM) For every k ∈ ϑ(t):
min
j∈t∩M(k)
νkj ≥ βkt ≥ max
j∈q∩U
νkj .
As all the ν variables are in [0, 1], then the above conditions can be interpreted as geometric
conditions in the [0, 1]D(t)-hypercube.
The proof of Lemma 3 is partitioned into two lemmas. Given a core solution (M,α), let the
event D(t, δ) be defined as:
D(t, δ) = {βtz ≥ δ ∀z ∈ ϑ(t)}. (27)
Lemma B.1 below deals with D(t, δ) whereas Lemma B.2 deals with the complement D(t, δ). To-
gether they imply Lemma 3.
Lemma B.1. Consider a core solution (M,α) and a type t. Let the events F1(t), D(t, δ) and
B2(t, δ) be as defined by Eqs. (12), (27) and (11) respectively. Under F1(t) ∩ D(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ),
we have maxt′∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxt,t′ − αmint,t′
)
≤ f2(nt)/δD(t)−1, where f2 is as defined in the statement of
Lemma A.2.
Proof. Let D = D(t). Fix k ∈ ϑ(t) and consider the orthotope R˜k = R˜k(t, δ) as defined by
Eq. (7). As D(t, δ) occurs, βtz ≥ 1/δ for all z ∈ ϑ(t) and therefore R˜k can only contain points
corresponding to agents in M(k) ∪ U . By using the notation introduced above, condition (IM) in
Proposition 2 implies: αmaxkt − αminkt ≤ minj∈t∩M(k) νkj − maxj∈q∩U νkj . However, minj∈t∩M(k) νkj −
maxj∈q∩U νkj ≤ minj∈R˜k∩M(k) νkj −maxj∈R˜k∩U νkj ≤ V˜ k(t, δ), where V˜ k(t, δ) is as defined by Eq. (9).
Therefore, for each k ∈ ϑ(t) we must have αmaxkt − αminkt ≤ V˜ k(t, δ). Finally, under B2(t, δ) we have
maxk∈ϑ(t) V˜ k(t, δ) ≤ f2(nt)/δD−1, which completes the result.
Lemma B.2. Consider a core solution (M,α) and a type t. Let F1(t) be the event defined in
Eq. (12). Let the event B1(t, δ) be as defined by Eq. (10), and let the event D(t, δ) denote the comple-
ment of the event defined by Eq. (27). Under F1(t)∩D(t, δ)∩B1(t, δ), we have maxt′∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxt,t′ − αmint,t′
)
≤
f1(nt,D(t)) + δ, where f1 is as defined in the statement of Lemma A.1.
Proof. Suppose t ∈ TE . Consider the unit hypercube in RK . For each j ∈ E such that τ(j) = t,
let ǫj ∈ [0, 1]K denote the vector of realizations of ǫkj for every k ∈ TL. By condition (ST) in
Proposition 2, we can partition the [0, 1]K hypercube into |ϑ(t)| regions such that all the points ǫ
corresponding to agents matched to k ∈ ϑ(t) must be contained in the corresponding region. In
particular, for each k ∈ ϑ(t), we define Z(k) ⊆ [0, 1]K to be the region corresponding to type k,
with Z(k) = ∩k′∈ϑ(t), k′ 6=k{x ∈ [0, 1]K : xk − xk′ ≥ αk′t − αkt}. Note that the region Z(k) can only
contain points corresponding to agents matched to k or unmatched.
Let k∗ = argmaxk∈TL{αtk∗ : k ∈ ϑ(t)}, and let Rk
∗
= Rk∗(t) be as defined by Eq. (1). By
condition (ST) in Proposition 2, we have that for all k ∈ ϑ(t):
min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj ≥ αkt − αk∗t ≥ max
j∈q∩M(k)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj .
As αkt − αk∗t ≤ 0 for all k ∈ ϑ(t), we must have Rk∗ ⊆ Z(k∗). Let V k∗ = V k∗(t) be as
defined in Eq. (4). We claim that αmaxk∗,t − αmink∗,t ≤ V k
∗
. To see why this holds, consider two
separate cases. First, suppose there is at least one point corresponding to an unmatched agent in
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Rk∗ . By condition (IM) in Proposition 2, we must have minj∈t∩M(k∗) ǫk∗j ≥ −αk∗t ≥ maxj∈t∩U ǫk
∗
j .
Hence, αmaxk∗,t − αmink∗,t ≤ minj∈t∩M(k∗) ǫk
∗
j − maxj∈t∩U ǫk
∗
j ≤ V k
∗
as desired. For the second case,
suppose that all points in Rk∗ correspond to matched agents. As maxj∈t∩U ǫk∗j ≥ 0, we must
have αmaxk∗,t − αmink∗,t ≤ minj∈t∩M(k∗) ǫk
∗
j ≤ minj∈Rk∗ ǫk
∗
j ≤ V k
∗
, as the difference between 0 and the
minj∈Rk∗ ǫ
k∗
j is upper bounded by V
k∗ . Therefore, we conclude αmaxk∗,t − αmink∗,t ≤ V k
∗
.
Next, we consider the bound for any arbitrary type k ∈ ϑ(t). By condition (ST) in Proposition 2,
we have that for all k ∈ ϑ(t):
αmaxk∗t + min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj ≥ αkt ≥ max
j∈q∩M(k)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj + αmink∗t .
Therefore,
αmaxkt − αminkt ≤ αmaxk∗t − αmink∗t + min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj − max
j∈q∩M(k)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj .
From our previous bound, we have that αmaxk∗t − αmink∗t ≤ V k
∗
. We now want an upper bound on
minj∈t∩M(k∗) ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj −maxj∈q∩M(k) ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj . Let Rk
∗,k = Rk∗,k(t, delta) and V k∗,k = V k∗,k(t) be
as defined by Eqs. (2) and (6). We shall show that minj∈t∩M(k∗) ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj −maxj∈q∩M(k) ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj ≤
V k
∗,k + δ. Recall that, under D(t, δ), we have δ ≥ αk∗t.
To that end, note that all points in Rk∗,k must correspond to agents matched to k∗ or matched
to k, as the region Rk∗,k cannot contain unmatched without violating condition (IM). Furthermore,
as Rk∗ ⊆ Z(k∗) and Rk∗ ∩Rk∗,k 6= ∅, at least one point in Rk∗,k corresponds to an agent matched
to k∗. We now consider two separate cases, depending on whether Rk∗,k contains a at least one
point matched to k. First, suppose Rk∗,k contains a at least one point matched to k. Then, the
bound trivially applies as
min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj − max
j∈t∩M(k)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj ≤ min
j∈Rk∗,k∩M(k∗)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj − max
j∈Rk∗,k∩M(k)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj ≤ V k
∗,k.
Otherwise, Rk∗,k contains only points matched to k∗. In that case,
min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj − max
j∈q∩M(k)
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj ≤ min
j∈Rk∗,k
ǫk
∗
j − ǫkj − (1 + αk∗t) ≤ V k
∗,k + δ,
as desired. Overall, we have shown that:
max
k∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxtk − αmintk
) ≤ max(V k∗, max
k∈ϑ(t)
(
V k
∗
+ V k
∗,k + δ
))
.
Under B1(t, δ) we have max
(
V k
∗
,maxk V
k∗,k
) ≤ f1(nt,K), implying
max
(
V k
∗
, max
k∈ϑ(t)
(
V k
∗
+ V k
∗,k + δ
))
≤ 2f1(nt,K) + δ,
as desired.
To conclude, we briefly discuss the changes when t ∈ TL. Consider the unit hypercube in RQ.
For each j ∈ L such that τ(j) = t, let ηj ∈ [0, 1]Q denote the vector of realizations of ηqj for every
q ∈ TE . For each q ∈ ϑ(t), we define Z(q) ⊆ [0, 1]Q to be the region corresponding to type q. The
main difference with the case in which t ∈ TE is that we need to define the regions Z(q) in terms
of the η˜ instead of η. To that end, let βkq = αkq − u(k, q). By the (ST) condition in Proposition 2,
we must have:
min
i∈t∩M(q′)
η˜q
′
i − η˜qi ≥ αtq′ − αtq ≥ max
i∈t∩M(q)
η˜q
′
i − η˜qi ,
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or equivalently,
min
i∈t∩M(q′)
ηq
′
i − ηqi ≥ βtq′ − βtq ≥ max
i∈t∩M(q)
ηq
′
i − ηqi .
By using β instead of α, the same geometric intuition as before applies. Then, we define
Z(q) = ∩q′∈ϑ(t), q′ 6=q{x ∈ [0, 1]Q : xq − xq′ ≥ βqt − βq′t}. To select q∗, we just select the one with
smallest βqt. The rest of the proof remains the same.
Proof of Lemma 3. Lemma 3 immediately follows from Lemmas B.1 and B.2.
Proof of Lemma 4. Consider a core solution (M,α). Let D = D(t). Fix a type t∗ ∈ ϑ(t), and
let k∗ = argmaxk∈ϑ(t)βtk. We start by showing that, under F2(t) ∩ B1(t, δ), we must have αmaxtk∗ −
αmintk∗ ≤
(
αmaxt,t∗ − αmint,t∗
)
+ f1(nt,D(t)) + 2δ. If k
∗ = t∗, the claim follows trivially. Otherwise, let
Rk∗,t∗ = Rk∗,t∗(t, δ) and V k∗,t∗ = V k∗,t∗(t, δ) be as defined by Eqs. (2) and (6). We show that
minj∈t∩M(k∗) νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j −maxj∈q∩M(t∗) νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j ≤ V k
∗,t∗ + δ.
To that end, note that all points in Rk∗,t∗ must correspond to agents matched to k∗ or matched
to t∗, as under F2(t) all agents in t are matched. Furthermore, by the definition of k∗, Rk∗,t∗ must
contain a point corresponding to an agent matched to k∗. We now consider two separate cases,
depending on whether Rk∗,t∗ contains at least one point corresponding to an agent matched to t∗.
First, suppose Rk∗,t∗ contains at least one point corresponding to an agent matched to t∗. Then,
min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j − max
j∈t∩M(t∗)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j ≤ min
j∈Rk∗,t∗∩M(k∗)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j − max
j∈Rk∗,t∗∩M(k)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j ≤ V k
∗,t∗ .
Otherwise, Rk∗,t∗ contains only points matched to k∗. In that case,
min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j − max
j∈t∩M(t∗)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j ≤ min
j∈Rk∗,t∗
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j − 1 ≤ V k
∗,t∗ + δ,
as desired. By condition (ST) in Proposition 2, we must have:
αmaxtk∗ − αmintk∗ ≤ αmaxtt∗ − αmintt∗ + min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j − max
j∈t∩M(t∗)
νk
∗
j − νt
∗
j ≤ αmaxtt∗ − αmintt∗ + V k
∗,t∗ + δ
Next, consider an arbitrary k ∈ ϑ(t) with k 6= t∗, k∗. By condition (ST) in Proposition 2, we
must have:
αmaxkt − αminkt ≤ αmaxk∗t − αmink∗t + min
j∈t∩M(k∗)
νk
∗
j − νkj − max
j∈q∩M(k)
νk
∗
j − νkj .
Let Rk∗,k = Rk∗,k(t, δ) and V k∗,k = V k∗,k(t) be as defined by Eqs. (2) and (6). By repeating
the same arguments as before, we can show that minj∈t∩M(k∗) νk
∗
j − νkj −maxj∈q∩M(k) νk
∗
j − νkj ≤
V k
∗,k + 2δ. Hence,
αmaxkt − αminkt ≤ αmaxk∗t − αmink∗t + V k
∗,k + δ ≤ αmaxtt∗ − αmintt∗ + V k
∗,t∗ + V k
∗,k + 2δ.
To conclude, note that
max
k∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxkt − αminkt
) ≤ (αmaxtt∗ − αmintt∗ )+ 2
(
max
k∈ϑ(t)
V k
∗,k
)
+ 2δ ≤ (αmaxtt∗ − αmintt∗ )+ 2f1(nt,D) + 2δ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that B1(t, δ) occurs by hypothesis.
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We can now proceed to the proof of the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 1. Let n∗ = mint∈TL∪TE nt. Under Assumption 2, we have that n
∗ = Θ(n). Let
δ = 1/(n∗)1/max(K,Q). For each t ∈ TL ∪ TE , let the events B1(t, δ) and B2(t, δ) be as defined by
Eqs. (10) and (11) respectively. We start by showing that, under
⋂
t∈TL∪TE (B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ)), we
must have C ≤ O∗
(
1
max(K,Q)
√
n
)
.
To that end, construct the type-adjacency graph G(M) as defined in Section 4. For each
vertex v, we denote by d(v) the minimum distance between v and any marked vertex (that is,
d(v) = 0 if v is marked, d(v) = 1 if v is unmarked and has a marked neighbour, and so on). By
Lemma 1, we know that w.p.1, each connected component of G(M) must contain at least one
marked vertex, so d(v) is well-defined for all v. Let Cd = {v ∈ C : d(v) = d}, that is Cd is the set
of vertices that are at distance d from a marked vertex. We now show the result by induction in
d. In particular, we show that, under
⋂
t∈TL∪TE (B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ)), for each t ∈ Cd we have that
maxk∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxtk − αmintk
) ≤ gd(n∗,max(K,Q)) for some gd(n∗,max(K,Q)) = O∗( 1n1/max(K,Q) ).
We start by showing that the claim holds for the base case d = 0. For each t ∈ C0, either all
agents in t are unmatched or at least one agent is matched. In the former case, we can just ignore
type t as it will not contribute to the size of the core. In the latter, we note that w.p.1 the event
F1(t) as defined in the statement of Lemma 3 must hold. Therefore, we can apply Lemma 3 to
obtain maxt′∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxt,t′ − αmint,t′
)
≤ max (f1(nt,D(t)) + δ, f2(nt)/δD(t)−1), where f1 and f2 are as
defined in the statement of the lemma. To conclude the proof of the base case, let
g0(n
∗,max(K,Q)) = max
(
f1(n
∗,max(K,Q)) + δ, f2(n∗)/δmax(K,Q)−1
)
.
By the definition of f1, f2, and δ, together with Assumption 2, we have g0(n
∗,max(K,Q)) =
O∗( 1
n1/max(K,Q)
). Therefore, we have shown that, for every t ∈ C0, we have
max
k∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxtk − αmintk
) ≤ g0(n∗,max(K,Q)).
Now suppose the result holds for all d′ ≤ d, we want to show it holds for d+ 1. Fix t ∈ Cd+1.
By definition of Cd+1, we have that all agents in t must be matched and therefore w.p.1, the event
F2(t) as defined in the statement of Lemma 4 occurs. Moreover, there must exist a t∗ such that
the vertex corresponding to t∗ is Cd and t∗ ∈ ϑ(t). By induction, we have that
(
αmaxtt∗ − αmintt∗
) ≤
gd(n
∗,max(K,Q)) for gd(n∗,max(K,Q)) = O∗( 1n1/max(K,Q) ). Further, by Lemma 4, we know that
under F2(t)∩B1(t, δ), we have maxt′∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxt,t′ − αmint,t′
)
≤ (αmaxt,t∗ − αmint,t∗ )+2f1(nt,D(t))+2δ, where
B1(t, δ) as defined by Eq. (13) and f is as defined in the statement of Lemma A.1. Therefore, by
letting gd+1(n
∗,max(K,Q)) = gd(n∗,max(K,Q)) + 2f1(n∗,max(K,Q)) + 2δ, we have show that
with probability at least 1 − d+1n∗ , we have maxk∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxtk − αmintk
) ≤ gd+1(n∗,max(K,Q)) with
gd+1(n
∗,max(K,Q)) = O∗( 1
n1/max(K,Q)
).
Next, we note that maxv d(v) is upper bounded by K + Q. Hence, for every t ∈ TL ∪ TE , we
have maxk∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxtk − αmintk
) ≤ gK+Q(n∗,max(K,Q)) for gK+Q(n∗,max(K,Q)) = O∗( 1n1/max(K,Q) )
and therefore
max
t∈TL∪TE
max
k∈ϑ(t)
(
αmaxtk − αmintk
) ≤ gK+Q(n∗,max(K,Q)).
To conclude, by Lemma 2 we have that with probability at least 1 − 2(K+Q)n∗ , the event⋂
t∈TL∪TE (B1(t, δ) ∩ B2(t, δ)) occurs. In all other cases, we just use the fact that the size of the
core is upper-bounded by a constant C <∞. Hence,
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E[C] =
∑
(k,q)∈TL×TE N(k, q)
(
αmaxkq − αminkq
)
∑
(k,q)∈TL×TE N(k, q)
≤ (K +Q)gK+Q(n∗,max(K,Q)) + C 2(K +Q)
n∗
= O∗
(
1
max(K,Q)
√
n
)
implying the main result for large enough n (note that 2(K+Q)n∗ = Θ
∗(1/n)).
C Theorem 1 lower bound: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof of Proposition 3.
Claim C.1. For this market, all labor agents of types different from k∗ will be matched in the core.
Proof. We know that there is some employer j who is either unmatched or matched to a labor agent
i′ of type k∗. Consider any matching where a labor agent i of type k 6= k∗ is unmatched. Now
Φ(i′, j) = ǫi′ + ηk∗j ≤ 1 + 1 = 2, whereas Φ(i, j) ≥ u(k, 1) = 3, hence the weight of such a matching
can be increased by instead matching j to i. It follows that in any maximum weight matching, all
labor agents with type different from k∗ are matched. Finally, recall that every core outcome lives
on a maximum weight matching, cf. Proposition 2
Among agents i ∈ k∗, exactly one agent will be matched, specifically agent i∗ = argmaxi∈k∗ ηi.
Let j∗ be the agent matched to i∗ (break ties arbitrarily). Recall that core solutions always live on a
maximum weight matching, and in case of multiple maximum weight matchings, the set of vectors
α such that (M,α) is a core solution is the same for any maximum weight matchingM . This allows
us to suppress the matching, and talk about a vector α being in the core, cf. Proposition 2. The
(IM) condition in Proposition 2 for the pair of types (k∗, 1) are
ηi∗ ≥ αk∗ ≥ max
i∈k∗\i∗
ηi , (28)
and the slack condition αk∗ ≥ −ǫk∗j∗ . The (IM) conditions for types (k, 1) for k 6= k∗ are
3 + min
i∈k
ηi∗ ≥ αk ≥ − min
j∈M(k)
ǫkj . (29)
The stability conditions are
min
j∈M(k)
ǫkj − ǫk
′
j ≥ αk′ − αk ≥ max
j∈M(k′)
ǫkj − ǫk
′
j , (30)
for all k 6= k′. It is easy to see that Eq. (30) with k′ = k∗ implies αk ≤ 2 for all k 6= k∗. Hence, the
upper bound in Eq. (29) is slack. Consider the left stability inequality with k′ = k∗. As Eq.(28)
implies αk∗ ≥ 0, we must have
αk ≥ − min
j∈M(k)
ǫkj − ǫk∗j ≥ − min
j∈M(k)
ǫkj
implying that the lower bound in (29) is also slack. Thus a vector α is in the core if and only if
conditions (28) and (30) are satisfied.
For simplicity, we start with the special case K = 2, with the two types of labor being k and
k∗. To obtain intuition, notice that from Eq. (28) we have αk∗
n˜→∞−−−→ 1 in probability, and when we
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use this together with Eq. (30) we obtain αk
n˜→∞−−−→ 2 in probability. (We do not use these limits in
our formal analysis below.) Hence, we focus on Eq. (28) together with
min
j 6=j∗
ǫkj − ǫk∗j ≥ αk∗ − αk ≥ ǫkj∗ − ǫk∗j∗ . (31)
where j∗ = argminj ǫkj −ǫk∗j . Now, Xj = ǫkj −ǫk∗j are distributed i.i.d. with density U [0, 1]∗U [−1, 0]
which is
f(x) =
{
1− |x| for |x| ≤ 1
0 otherwise.
(32)
(Note that if we draw n˜+1 samples from this distribution, it is not hard to see that E[(minj 6=j∗ Xj)−
Xj∗ ] = Θ(1/
√
n˜).) We lower bound the expected core size as follows: LetXj = ǫ
k
j−ǫk∗j . Let B be the
event that exactly one of the Xj ’s is in [−1,−1+ 1/
√
n˜], and no Xj is in [−1+ 1/
√
n˜,−1 + 2/√n˜].
Under f the probability of being in [−1,−1 + 1/√n˜] is 1/(2n˜) and the probability of being in
[−1 + 1/√n˜,−1 + 2/√n˜] is 3/(2n˜). It follows that
Pr(B) =
(
n˜+ 1
1, 0, n˜
)
1
2n
(
1− 2/n˜)n˜ = Ω(1) . (33)
Claim C.2. Consider the case K = 2. Under event B, for any core vector (αk∗ , αk), for any value
α′k ∈ [αk∗ + 1− 2/
√
n˜, αk∗ + 1− 1/
√
n˜], we have that vector (αk∗ , α
′
k) is in the core. In particular,
C = Ω(1/√n˜).
Proof. Eq. (31) is satisfied since event B holds. Since, αk′ can take any value in an interval of
length 1/
√
n˜, it follows that C = Ω(1/√n˜) under B.
Combining Claim C.2 with Eq. (33), we obtain that E[C] = Ω(1/√n˜) as desired.
We now construct a similar argument for K > 2, with K = TL\{k∗} being the other labor types,
all of whose agents are matched. It again turns out that αk∗
n˜→∞−−−→ 1 in probability, and when we
use this together with Eq. (30) we obtain αk
n˜→∞−−−→ 2 ∀k ∈ K in probability (but we do not prove
or use these limits).
Considering only the dimensions in K (recall |K| = K − 1 here) of each ǫj, let B3 be the event
as defined in Lemma A.4 with δ = 1/n0.51.
Claim C.3. Let k = argmink∈K αk and let k¯ = argmaxk∈K αk. Under event B3, we claim that
αk¯ − αk ≤ δ (34)
Proof. From Proposition 2, we know that the set of core α’s is a linear polytope, hence it is
immediate to see that the set of θ’s is an interval. Let k = argmink∈K αk and let k¯ = argmaxk∈K αk.
Under event B3, we claim that αk¯−αk ≤ δ. We can argue this by contradiction: Suppose αk¯−αk >
δ. One can see that all j’s such that ǫKj ∈ R̂k¯,k(δ), cf. (22), will be matched to type k¯, with the
possible exception of j∗. Thus, under B3, the number of employers matched to type k¯ is bounded
below by
nk¯,k − 1 ≥ ((K − 1)n˜ + 1)/(K − 1) > n˜ ,
which is a contradiction, implying (34).
The above claim bounds the maximum difference between α’s corresponding to any pair of types
in K. Intuitively, note that all types in K have the same u and therefore the same distribution
for the θ variables of the agents in such type. Moreover, all types in K have the same number of
agents. Hence, one would expect the α’s to be equal. While true in the limit, for each finite n we
need to account for the stochastic fluctuations in given realization. Therefore, we can show that
no pair of α’s in K can differ by more than δ. The next claim follows immediately from Claim C.3.
22
Claim C.4. Let k ∈ K be an arbitrary type. Under event B3, we claim that
max
k′∈K
(
ǫk
′
j − ǫkj
)
≤ δ ∀j ∈M(k) (35)
Proof. By Claim C.3, we have that under B3, |αk − αk′ | ≤ δ for all k′ ∈ cK. By the stability
condition in Eq. (30), we have
δ ≥ αk − αk′ ≥ ǫk′j − ǫkj ∀j ∈M(k), ∀k′ ∈ K.
Therefore, for every j ∈M(k) we must have δ ≥ maxk′∈K ǫk′j − ǫkj as desired.
Next, we focus on the stability conditions involving type k∗. For each k ∈ K, the stability
condition is:
ǫk∗j∗ − ǫkj∗ ≥ αk − αk∗ ≥ maxj∈M(k) ǫ
k∗
j − ǫkj , . (36)
where j∗ is the employer matched to i∗. For each j ∈ E , let Xj be defined as Xj = (maxk∈K ǫkj )−ǫk∗j .
The Xj are distributed i.i.d. with cumulative distribution F (−1+ θ) = θK/K for θ ∈ [0, 1] (we will
not be concerned with the cumulative for positive values). Let B be the event that exactly one of
the Xj ’s is in [−1,−1 + 1/n˜1/K ] (this will be Xj∗), and no Xj is in [−1 + 1/n˜1/K ,−1 + 2/n˜1/K ].
Under cumulative F , the probability of being in [−1,−1 + 1/n˜1/K ] is 1/(Kn˜) and the probability
of being in [−1 + 1/n˜1/K ,−1 + 2/n˜1/K ] is 2K/(Kn˜). It follows that
Pr(B) =
(
n˜+ 1
1, 0, n˜
)
1
Kn
(
1− 2K/(Kn˜))n˜ = Ω(1) . (37)
Clearly, under B, we must have j∗ = argminj∈E Xj . Keeping this in mind, we state and prove
our last claim.
Claim C.5. Suppose B3 ∩ B occurs. Take any core vector (αk∗ , (αk)k∈K). Then
{θ ∈ R : (αk∗ , (αk + θ)k∈K) is in the core} (38)
is an interval of length at least 1/n1/K − 2δ = Ω(1/n1/K). In particular, C ≥ Ω(1/n1/K).
Proof. Define
θ = 1− 2/n˜1/K + δ − αk + αk∗
θ = 1− 1/n˜1/K − αk¯ + αk∗
We claim that, under B3∩B, we have that α(θ) = (αk∗ , (αk + θ)k∈K) is in the core for all θ ∈ [θ, θ].
To establish this, we need to show that conditions (28) and (30) are satisfied. Since α belongs to
the core, we immediately infer that (28) holds, and also (30) when k∗ /∈ {k, k′} by definition of
α(θ). That leaves us with (36). Now, for any k ∈ K and θ ∈ [θ, θ] we have
αk(θ) = αk + θ ≤ αk¯ + θ ≤ αk¯ + θ = 1− 1/n˜1/K + αk∗ ≤ ǫk∗j∗ − ǫkj∗ + αk∗ ,
where used the definitions of k¯ and θ, and the fact that B occurs (so 1− 1/n˜1/K ≤ ǫk∗j∗ − ǫkj∗). This
establishes the left inequality in (36). Similarly, for any k ∈ K we have
αk(θ) = αk + θ ≥ αk + θ ≥ αk + θ = 1− 2/n˜1/K + δ + αk∗
≥ ǫk∗j −max
k′∈K
ǫk
′
j + δ + αk∗ ≥ ǫk∗j − ǫkj + αk∗ ∀j ∈M(k) ,
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where used the definitions of k and θ for the first two inqualities, and the fact that B occurs (so
1 − 2/n˜1/K ≥ ǫk∗j − maxk′∈K ǫk
′
j , ∀j ∈ M(k)). Finally, the last inequality follows from B3 and
Claim C.4 (which implies −maxk′∈K ǫk′j + δ ≥ −ǫkj for j ∈ M(k)). This establishes the right
inequality in (36). Thus, we have shown that α(θ) is in the core for all θ ∈ [θ, θ]. The length of
this interval is 1/n˜1/K − (αk¯ − αk) − δ ≥ 1/n˜1/K − 2δ = Ω(1/n˜1/K), using (34). Therefore, that
E[C] = Ω(1/n˜1/K) under B3 ∩ B.
Using Lemma A.4 and Eq. (37) we have
Pr(B3 ∩ B) = Ω(1) .
Combining with the claim above we obtain that E[C] = Ω(1/n1/K).
D Proof of Theorem 2
We start by restating Theorem 2 and discussing the structure of the proof.
Theorem (Restatement of Theorem 2). Consider the setting in which K ≥ 2, Q = 1, nE > nL and
let m = nE − nL. In addition, suppose that u(k, 1) ≥ 0 for all k ∈ TL. Then, under Assumption 2,
we have E[C] ≤ O∗
(
1
n
1
Km
K−1
K
)
.
Note that Assumption 1 is automatically satisfied under the hypotheses of the theorem.
The idea of the proof is as follows. First, we show a bound on the expectation of mink∈TL{αmaxk −
αmink }. In particular, we show that E
[
mink∈TL{αmaxk − αmink }
]
= O∗
(
1
n
1
Km
K−1
K
)
. To do so, we
note that by condition (IM) in Proposition 2, we must have
min
k
(
αmaxk − αmink
) ≤ min
k∈TL
(
min
j∈M(k)
ǫkj −max
j∈U
ǫkj
)
.
Then, we consider two separate cases to prove the result, depending the size of the imbalance.
When m ≤ log(n), the result is shown in Lemma D.1, which we prove via an upper bound on
mink∈TL
(
minj∈M(k) ǫkj
)
. On the contrary, when m ≥ log(n), the result is shown in Lemma D.4.
The proof of Lemma D.4 relies mainly on the geometry of a core solution which (roughly) allows
us to first control the largest of the α’s (all α’s must be negative i in the core since some employers
are unmatched, and we control, roughly, the least negative α).
Next, we then show that, for every pair of types k, q ∈ TL we must have
E
[
min
j∈M(k)
(ǫkj − ǫqj)− max
j∈M(q)
(ǫkj − ǫqj)
]
= O∗
(
1
n
)
.
By Condition (ST) in Proposition 2, this implies that for fixed k, q ∈ TL, the expected maximum
variation in αk − αq in the core is bounded by O∗
(
1
n
)
.
Finally, we use the bounds in the first two steps to argue that, for every type k ∈ TL,
E
[
αmaxk − αmink }
]
= O∗
(
1
n
1
Km
K−1
K
)
,
which implies E[C] = O∗
(
1
n
1
Km
K−1
K
)
. This is done in the proof of Theorem 2.
We now show our bound on E
[
mink{αmaxk − αmink }
]
. To that end, let Zk = minj∈M(k) ǫkj and
Uk = maxj∈U ǫkj . By Condition (IM) in Proposition 2, E
[
mink |αmaxk − αmink |
] ≤ E[mink{Zk−Uk}],
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and therefore we will focus on bounding E[mink{Zk − Uk}]. As a reminder, we have defined
m = nE −nL and δn = log(n)
n
1
Km
K−1
K
. Also, in all lemmas we are working under the assumptions of the
theorem, that is, K ≥ 2, Q = 1, nE > nL and Assumption 2.
Lemma D.1. Suppose m ≤ 6K log(nE). Then, there exists a constant C3 = C3(K) <∞ such that
E
[
mink{αmaxk − αmink }
] ≤ 2C3 log(n)
n
1
Km
K−1
K
.
Proof. Let Zk = minj∈M(k) ǫkj , Uk = maxj∈U ǫ
k
j and δn =
log(n)
n
1
Km
K−1
K
. By Condition (IM) in Propo-
sition 2, E[mink{αmaxk − αmink }] ≤ E[mink{Zk − Uk}]. As Uk is a non-negative random variable, we
have E[mink{Zk − Uk}] ≤ E[mink{Zk}]. Therefore,
E[min
k
{αmaxk − αmink }] ≤ E
[
min
k
{Zk − Uk}
]
≤ E
[
min
k
{Zk}
]
≤ C3δn + Pr
(
min
k
Zk ≥ C3δn
)
,
using Zk ≤ 1.
To finish the proof, it suffices to show that Pr (mink Zk ≥ C3δn) ≤ C3δn. Hence, our next step
is to bound Pr (mink Zk ≥ C3δn). Now mink Zk ≥ C3δn implies that all j such that ǫj ∈ [0, C3δn]K
are unmatched. But there are only m unmatched employers. It follows that
Pr
(
min
k
Zk ≥ C3δn
)
≤ Pr
(
at most m points in the hypercube [0, C3δn]
K
)
Let X ∼ Bin
(
nE , (C3δn)K
)
be defined as the number of points, out of nE in total, that fall
in the hypercube [0, C3δn]
K . By assumption, m ≤ 6K log(n) ⇒ (C3δn)K ≥ (C3 log n/m)K/n ≥
2K log nK/n ≥ 4(log n)2/n defining C3 ≥ 12K and using K ≥ 2. Further using n ≤ 2nE we obtain
E[X] = nE (C3δn)K ≥ (n/2)4(log n)2/n = 2(log n)2. It follows that
Pr
(
min
k
Zk ≥ C3δn
)
≤ Pr (X ≤ 6K log(n)) ≤ exp(−Ω((log n)2)) ≤ 1
n
≤ C3δn
where the second inequality was obtained by applying the Chernoff bound. Hence, we have shown
that
E[min
k
{αmaxk − αmink }] ≤ E
[
min
k
{Zk}
]
≤ C3δn + Pr
(
min
k
Zk ≥ C3δn
)
≤ 2C3δn,
which completes the proof.
We now establish an upper bound for the case in which m ≥ 6K log(nE). For the following
results up to Lemma D.4 we shall assume m ≥ 6K log(nE).
Before we move on, we briefly give some geometric intuition regarding the problem. For each
agent j ∈ E , let ǫj = (ǫ1j , . . . , ǫKj ) denote the profile of values assigned by the K types of agents
in L to agent j. Given our stochastic assumptions, all points ǫj will be distributed in the [0, 1]K
hypercube. Using Proposition 2, we can partition the [0, 1]K -hypercube into K+1 disjoint regions:
K of them containing the nk points corresponding to agents matched to type k (1 ≤ k ≤ K), and
one region containing all unmatched agents. Furthermore, the region containing the unmatched
agents is an orthotope8 that has the origin as a vertex. This follows for the (IM) constraints in
Proposition 2.
8An orthotope (also called a hyperrectangle or a box) is the generalization of a rectangle for higher dimensions
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To that end, let O be the set of K-orthotopes contained in [0, 1]K that have the origin as
a vertex. Suppose R is expanded by the same amount θ in each coordinate direction. Define
D(R) as the smallest value of θ such that an additional point ǫj is contained in the expanded
orthotope. (If one of the side lengths becomes 1 before an additional point is reached, then define
D(R) = 0. This will never occur for R that contains only the unmatched agents.) As usual, let
Zk = minj∈M(k) ǫkj and Uk = maxj∈U ǫ
k
j . We want to show that E [mink{Zk − Uk}] ≤ C5δn, for
some constant C5 = C5(K) <∞. To that end, note that mink{Zk −Uk} is equal to D(R) for some
orthotope R ∈ O. In particular, mink{Zk − Uk} is equal to D(R) when R is the orthotope that
“tightly” contains all the m points in U .
For R ∈ O, let V (R) be defined as the volume of R. In addition, we define |R| to be the number
of points contained in R. We start by showing that, given that m ≥ 6K log(n), an orthotope in O
of volume less than m4nE in extremely unlikely to contain m points.
Lemma D.2. Suppose m ≥ 6K log(n). For R ∈ O such that V (R) < m4nE , we have Pr (|R| = m) ≤
1
nK+1
, where V (R) denotes the volume and |R| denotes the number of points in R.
Proof. LetX denote number of points in an orthotope inO of volume m4nE . Then,X ∼ Bin
(
nE , m4nE
)
.
We have µ = E[X] = m/4. Using a Chernoff bound we have,
Pr(X ≥ m) = Pr(X ≥ 4µ) ≤ (e3/44)m/4 ≤ exp(−m/4)
Now m/4 ≥ 6K log n/4 ≥ (K + 1) log n, using K ≥ 2. Substituting back we obtain Pr(X ≥ m) ≤
exp(−(K+1) log n) = 1/nK+1. But |X| stochastically dominates |R| since V (R) < m4nE . The result
follows.
Our next step will be to bound Pr
(
D(R) > C4δ
∣∣ E) , for R ∈ O and some constant C4 =
C4(K) <∞ where E is the event defined as E = {|R| = m, V (R) ≥ m4nE }.
Lemma D.3. There exists some constant C4 = C4(K) < ∞ such that, for all R ∈ O with
V (R) ≥ m4nE , we have that P
(
D(R) > C4δn
∣∣ |R| = m) ≤ 1
nK+1
, where δn =
log(n)
n
1
Km
K−1
K
.
Proof. Conditioned on |R| = m, the remaining nL = nE −m points are distributed uniformly i.i.d.
in the complementary region of volume (1− V (R)).
Let FC4δn denote the region swept when R is expanded by C4δn along each coordinate axis.
Clearly, D(R) > C4δn if and only if region FC4δn contains no points.
Let X denote the number of points in FC4δn , and let p denote the volume of FC4δn . Then,
X ∼ Bin(nL, p/(1 − V (R))) and hence stochastically dominates Bin(nL, p)). Note that such a
volume p is at least the volume obtained when expanding the hypercube of side ℓ = K
√
m
4nE
by C4δn
along each direction and therefore, p ≥ Kℓ(K−1)C4δn. Hence,
P (D(R) > C4δn) = Pr(X = 0) ≤ (1− p)L ≤ exp {−Ω(np)}
≤ exp{−Ω(n(m
n
)(K−1)/KC4δn)} = exp{−Ω(C4 log n)} ≤ 1
nK+1
,
for appropriate C4, where we have used Assumption 2.
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Lemma D.4. Suppose m ≥ 6K log(n). Then, there exists a constant C5 = C5(K) <∞, such that
E
[
mink{αmaxk − αmink }
] ≤ C5 log(n)
n
1
Km
K−1
K
.
Proof. Let Zk = minj∈M(k) ǫkj , Uk = maxj∈U ǫ
k
j and δn =
log(n)
n
1
Km
K−1
K
. By Condition (IM) in Propo-
sition 2, we know that αmaxk − αmink ≤ Zk − Uk. Then,
E
[
min
k
{αmaxk − αmink }
]
≤ E
[
min
k
{Zk − Uk}
]
.
In addition, mink{Zk−Uk} is equal toD(R) for some orthotopeR ∈ O. In particular, mink{Zk−Uk}
is equal to D(R) when R is the orthotope that “tightly” contains all the m points in U . Define
R = {R ∈ O : |R| = m}. Then,
E
[
min
k
{Zk − Uk}
]
≤ E
[
max
R∈R
{D(R)}
]
.
To bound E [maxR∈R {D(R)}], consider the grid that results from dividing each of the K co-
ordinate axes in the hypercube into intervals of length 1/n. Let ∆ denote that grid. Suppose we
just consider orthotopes in the grid, that is, the orthotopes whose sides are multiples of 1n . Let
R∆ = {R ∈ R : R ∈ ∆}. Then,
max
R∈R
{D(R)} ≤ max
R∈R∆
{D(R)}+ 1
n
,
and,
E
[
max
R∈R
{D(R)}
]
≤ E
[
max
R∈R∆
{D(R)}
]
+
1
n
.
Hence, we just need a bound for E [maxR∈R∆ {D(R)}]. Let V∗ = m4n . Note that D(R) ≤ 1 for
all R ∈ O and therefore,
E
[
max
R∈R∆
{D(R)}
]
≤ E
[
max
R∈R′∆
{D(R)}
]
+ Pr
(
min
R∈R∆
V (R) < V∗
)
where R′∆ = {R ∈ R∆ : V (R) ≥ V∗}. Now, by union bound
Pr
(
min
R∈R∆
V (R) < V∗
)
≤
∑
R∈∆:V (R)<V∗
Pr(|R| = m) ≤ nK · 1/nK+1 = 1/n .
using |{R ∈ ∆ : V (R) < V∗}| ≤ |{R ∈ ∆}| = nK and Lemma D.2.
Further,
E
[
max
R∈R′∆
{D(R)}
]
≤ E
[
max
R∈∆:V (R)≥V∗
{D(R)I(|R| = m)}
]
Now,
Pr
[
max
R∈∆:V (R)≥V∗
{D(R)I(|R| = m)} > C4δn
]
≤
∑
R∈∆:V (R)≥V∗
Pr(|R| = m) Pr[D(R) > C4δn||R| = m]
≤
∑
R∈∆:V (R)≥V∗
1 · 1/nK+1 ≤ nK/nK+1 = 1/n
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using a union bound and Lemma D.3 to bound the probability of D(R) ≥ C4δn. It follows that
E
[
max
R∈R′∆
{D(R)}
]
≤ 1 · Pr
[
max
R∈∆:V (R)≥V∗
{D(R)I(|R| = m)} > C4δn
]
+ C4δn = 1/n + C4δn
Substituting the individual bounds back, we obtain
E
[
max
R∈R
{D(R)}
]
= C4δn + 2/n ≤ C5δn .
defining C5 = C4 + 2 and using 1/n ≤ δn.
Overall,
E
[
min
k
{αmaxk − αmink }
]
≤ E
[
min
k
{Zk − Uk}
]
≤ E
[
max
R∈R
{D(R)}
]
≤ C5δn
as claimed.
We now proceed to show that, for every pair of types k, q ∈ TL we have
E
[
min
j∈M(k)
(ǫkj − ǫqj)− max
j∈M(q)
(ǫkj − ǫqj)
]
≤ C2 log(nE)
nE
.
for appropriate C2 = C2(K) <∞. This result is shown in Lemma D.7. Along the way, we establish
a couple of intermediate results.
Let Zk = minj∈M(k) ǫkj and Uk = maxj∈U ǫ
k
j . Note that Zk is an upper bound for −αk. By the
definition of Zk, all the points corresponding agents in M(k) must be contained in the orthotope
[1− Zk, 1]× [0, 1]K−1. The following proposition establishes that Zk cannot be arbitrarily close to
1.
Lemma D.5. Given a constant c ∈ R, let the event Ec be defined as Ec = {maxkminj∈M(k) ǫkj ≤
1− c}. Then, there exist constants θ = θ(K) > 0 and C6 = C6(K) > 0 such that, for large enough
n, Eθ occurs with probability at least 1− exp (−C6n).
Proof. Let Zk = minj∈M(k) ǫkj . The proof follows from the previous observation that all the points
corresponding agents in M(k) must be contained in the orthotope of volume (1−Zk). Let C <∞
be such that
nE
nL
≤ C. By Assumption 2, such a C must exist. Furthermore, by Assumption 2,
there must exists CK ∈ R such that nk ≥ CKn for all k ∈ TL. Let nE be the total number of
points in the cube [0, 1]K . Let X denote the number of points out of the nE ones that fall in the
rectangle defined by [1 − θ, 1][0, 1]K−1. Then, X ∼ Bin(nE , θ). Suppose we set θ < CK2C .Then, for
large enough n and appropriate C6 > 0 we have
Pr(Zk > 1− θ) ≤ Pr(X ≥ CKnL) ≤ Pr
(
X ≥ CKnE
C
)
≤ exp (−2C6n) ≤ (1/K) exp (−C6n)
where we have used a Chernoff bound, 2nE ≥ n, and exp(−C6n) ≤ (1/K) for large enough n. The
result follows from a union bound over possible k.
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Remark D.1. Let θ, Eθ and C6 be as defined in the statement of Lemma D.5. Define Gk,q as
Gk,q =
{
x ∈ [0, 1]K :
(
xk ≥ 1− θ
2
or xq ≥ 1− θ
2
)
and xr <
θ
2
for all 1 ≤ r ≤ K, r 6= k, q
}
.
Under event Eθ, we must have Gk,q ⊆M(k) ∪M(q).
The above remark follows from Lemma D.5 and the definition of Gk,q. If j : ǫj ∈ Gk,q were
matched to a type k′ /∈ {k, q}, that will contradict maximality of the matching as, by swapping the
matches of j′ : j′ ∈ M(k), ǫkj′ = Zk and j, the overall weight of the matching strictly increases. A
similar argument rules out j being unmatched.
Lemma D.6. Let Gk,q be as in Remark D.1, and let θ be as defined in Lemma D.5. Define G
′
k,q
as follows:
G′k,q = Gk,q ∩ {x ∈ [0, 1]K , |xk − xq| ≤ 1− θ}
Let Vkq = {x : x = ǫkj − ǫqj , ǫj ∈ G′k,q}, and let
V kq = max(Difference between consecutive values in Vkq ∪ {−1 + θ, 1− θ}).
Then, there exists a function f(n) = O∗(1/n) such that Pr
(
Bkq
)
≤ 1/n where Bkq is the event
that V kq ≤ f(n).
The proof of Lemma D.6 is omitted as the required analysis is similar to (and much simpler than)
that leading to Lemma A.1. Essentially, V kq consists of values taken by Θ(n) points distributed
uniformly and independently in [−1+ θ, 1− θ], so, with high probability, no two consecutive values
are separated by more than f(n) = O(log n/n).
In the next lemma we bound the difference between every pair of α’s.
Lemma D.7. Consider types k, q ∈ TL and let f be as defined in the statement of Lemma D.6.
Under event Eθ ∩Bkq, in every stable solution we must have that (αmaxq −αminq ) ≤ 2f(n)+ (αmaxk −
αmink ).
Proof. We claim that under Eθ, we must have αq − αk varies within a range of no more than
V kq within the core, where V kq is as defined in the statement of Lemma D.6. By Remark D.1,
under event Eθ we must have G
′
kq ⊂ M(k) ∪M(q), where G′kq is as defined in the statement of
Lemma D.6. Suppose that G′kq contains at least one vertex matched to type k and one to type q.
Then, by Condition (ST) in Proposition 2 we must have:
(αq − αk)max − (αq − αk)min ≤ min
j∈M(k)
{ǫkj − ǫqj} − max
j∈M(q)
{ǫkj − ǫqj}
≤ min
j∈M(k)∩G′k,q
{ǫkj − ǫqj} − max
j∈M(q)∩G′k,q
{ǫkj − ǫqj}
≤ V kq
Next, consider the case in which all vertices in G′kq are matched to type k (the analogous argument
follows if they are all matched to type q). Under event Eθ, by Condition (IM) in Proposition 2 we
must have 0 ≤ −αk ≤ 1− θ and 0 ≤ −αq ≤ 1− θ. Therefore, αq−αk ∈ [−1+ θ, 1− θ]. In addition,
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by Condition (ST) in Proposition 2 we must have αq − αk ≤ minj∈M(k){ǫkj − ǫqj}. However,
(αq − αk)max − (αq − αk)min ≤ min
j∈M(k)
{ǫkj − ǫqj} − (−1 + θ)
≤ min
j∈M(k)∩G′k,q
{ǫkj − ǫqj} − (−1 + θ)
= min
j∈G′k,q
{ǫkj − ǫqj} − (−1 + θ)
≤ V kq
It follows that (αmaxq − αminq ) ≤ 2V kq + (αmaxk − αmink ). By definition, under Bkq we have
V kq ≤ f(n), which completes the proof.
Finally, we complete the last step of the proof by showing the main theorem.
Proof of Theorem 2. By definition, C =∑Kk=1 N(k)|αmaxk − αmink |nL , where N(k) is defined to be the
number of agents of type k that are matched. For a given instance, let k∗ = argmink{αmaxk − αmink }.
Let B = Eθ ∩ (∩k,qBk,q). Note that using Lemmas D.1 and D.6 and a union bound, we obtain that
Pr(B) ≤ Pr(Eθ) +
∑
k,q∈K:k 6=q
Pr(Bkq) = O(1/n) .
By Lemma D.7, under B, for every k ∈ TL we have
αmaxk − αmink ≤ 2f(n) + αmaxk∗ − αmink∗ .
Therefore,
E[C] ≤ E [αmaxk∗ − αmink∗ ]+ 2f(n) + Pr(B) ·O(1)
≤ O
(
log(n)
n
1
Km
K−1
K
)
+O∗(1/n) +O(1/n)
= O∗
(
1
n
1
Km
K−1
K
)
where the first inequality follows from the above together with using the upperbound of O(1)
for the core size; the second inequality is obtained by using the bound on E
[
αmaxk∗ − αmink∗
]
from
Lemma D.1 for m ≤ 6K log(n) and Lemma D.4 for m ≥ 6K log(n), as well as the definition of f(n)
and Pr(B) = O(1/n) shown above.
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